Peer-to-peer lending platforms are online intermediaries that match lenders with borrowers. We use data from the two leading P2P consumer lending platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, to explore main drivers of their expansion in the United States. We exploit the heterogeneity in local credit markets at the county level to analyze three hypotheses for the penetration of online lenders: 1) crisis-related; 2) competition-related; and 3) innovation-related. Our findings support the crisis-related and competition-related hypothesis, as lending platforms have expended more to counties with overleveraged banks and lower density of branch network. At the same time, lending platforms have difficulty penetrating countries with high bank concentration. We also document that spatial, socio-economic and demographic characteristics determine the expansion of online lenders.
Introduction
First peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms, Zopa, Prosper and Lending Club, have been launched in [2005] [2006] [2007] in the UK and the US. These online lenders 5 directly match savers with borrowers who need personal and business loans. Although, online lending amounts to a small share of total lending, it has been growing rapidly ( Figure 1 ) and in 2015, the flow of US online consumer lending was equivalent to 12.5% of traditional consumer lending (Wardrop et al., 2016) . Not surprisingly, the emergence of online lenders, which are a part of the wider FinTech movement, has provoked a debate about their ability to disrupt traditional banking (Phillipon, 2016; The Economist, 2015; Wolf, 2016; Citi, 2016) . Haldane (2016) suggests that the entry of new FinTech players could diversify the intermediation between savers and borrowers, which would make the financial sector more stable and efficient and could ensure greater access to financial services. The objective of this paper is to provide the first exploration of the main drivers of the expansion of the P2P lending in the US. Is rapid development of online lenders due to structural factors in the brick-and-mortar banking, such as weak competition in the consumer lending market due to high switching costs or barriers to entry? Has it been spurred by the Great Recession, bank failures, banks' deleveraging and credit crunch? Could the timing of the P2P lending be explained by the spread of Internet, sophistication of Internet users and trust in new technologies? What role do social networks play? What are the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of online borrowers? Ultimately, we would like to get closer to understanding whether online lenders could be potentially disrupt the traditional banking sector.
In light of these questions, we outline three main hypotheses for the expansion of online lenders. Our first hypothesis is that P2P lending development could be related to the nature of the banking competition. The banking sector is characterized by monopolistic competition due to high entry barriers, switching costs and strong brand loyalty (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Shy, 2002; Kim et al., 2003) . Philippon (2015) demonstrates that the cost of financial intermediation in the US have remained unchanged since the 19 century. This fact is astonishing in the context of rapid progress in the communication and information technologies that should have driven down the price of financial services for end users. Hence, the entry of new Fintech players could be needed to improve the provision of financial services and disrupt traditional players. Indeed, online lenders argue that their operating expenses are much lower than those of brick-andmortar banks due to the extensive use of new technologies as well as absence of legacy problems and costly branch networks. 6 We test the impact of the market structure on the expansion of online lenders and refer to these explanations as competition-based hypotheses.
7
The expansion of online lenders might have been spurred by the financial crisis and the Great Recession. On the credit supply side, as interest rates approached zero, new lenders entered the market, attracted by the higher return (and risk) available from exposure to P2P assets. On the credit demand side, a wider and more creditworthy pool of potential borrowers appeared as the banking sector was weak, regulation has tightened, banks have deleveraged and mistrust in the banks has spread (Atz and Bholat, 2016) . As shown by figure 2 below, total consumer credit significantly decreased in the years [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . The credit rationing may have spurred the demand for alternative forms of financing. For example, Koetter and Blaseg (2015) show that bank instability in Germany has pushed businesses to use equity crowdfunding as a source of external finance. We refer to this explanation as crisis-based hypothesis.
It is also possible that the surge in P2P lending is not caused by problems in the banking sector. Online lenders claim to harness big data innovations to revolutionize credit risk assessment and efficiently match lenders with borrowers. Furthermore, the entry of online lenders reflects the readiness of the society to embrace internet to perform financial transactions. Indeed, Fintech is part of the larger revolution as new internet platforms (Amazon, Uber, BlaBlaCar and AirBnB) are on the way to disrupt other service markets, such as retail trade, transport and accommodation. Similar to previous financial innovation, online lenders could expand and cheapen access to financial services (Einav et al., 2013) . We refer to this explanation as innovation-based hypothesis.
Sorting out these three competing hypotheses is difficult because the expansion of the P2P lending has coincided with the post-crisis period, increased concentration of the banking sector and the diffusion of communication and information technologies (e.g., smartphones, broadband). Our identification strategy relies on the exploration of the geographic heterogeneity of the P2P lending expansion at the county level. The choice of the local dimension of a market is relevant for consumer and SME lending that are targeted by online lenders. The county unit is the standard definition of the local banking market in the literature (e.g., Prager and Hannan, 1998; Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999; Rhoades, 2000; and Black and Strahan, 2002) .
Since the expansion of the P2P lending is similar to the diffusion of other technologies, it could be explained by spatial network effects due to human interactions (Comin et al., 2012) . Notwithstanding the online nature of the P2P lending, geography might still play a crucial role in its diffusion. Indeed, we document an important spatial correlation, as P2P lending per capita is higher in counties close to California, New York and Florida. Hence, our econometric approach relies on incorporating a spatial lag variable in our model.
8
This paper contributes to the nascent literature on the peer-to-peer lending. The largest strand of this literature explores how borrower characteristics affect loan outcomes and how lenders on P2P platforms mitigate informational frictions (see the literature review by Morse, 2015) .
9
The only paper that explores how borrowers choose between traditional and alternative sources of finance is Butler et al. (2014) , who show that borrowers who reside in areas with good access to bank finance request loans with lower interest rates.
This paper makes the first attempt to analyze the expansion patterns of online lenders. For the first time, we aggregate data for the two leading P2P consumer lending platforms in the USProsper and Lending Club -and study the geography of online lenders. We measure the expansion of the P2P lending by aggregating the number and the volume of loans provided by 8 This hypothesis is different from but related to the study by Agrawal et al. (2011) who find that crowdfunding largely overcomes the distance-related economic frictions as the average investor is not in the local market but is 3,000 miles away. Our hypothesis that the expansion of the P2P lending exhibits spatial correlation does not contradict the fact that investors could be located far away. 9 Morse (2015) provides a literature survey of papers that study how P2P lending mitigates information frictions by relying on real world social connections (Freedman and Jin, 2014; Everett, 2010) , textual analysis of successful funding bids (Mitra and Gilbert, 2014) , psychology text mining techniques to uncover deception (Gao and Lin, 2012) , identity claim methodology to identify trustworthy and hardworking borrowers (Sonenshein and Dholakia, 2011) as well as discrimination (Ravina, 2012; Pope and Sydnor, 2011; Duarte et al., 2012) . these two online lenders. As early as 2007, 1183 counties had P2P borrowers, and their number has increased to 2609 in 2013. We then use this data to relate the amount of P2P lending to a wide range of county level determinants that could affect the speed of its penetration.
By focusing on the expansion of a new technology, our paper is related to the literature on the diffusion of innovation (Bass, 1969 and Rogers, 2003) . 10 The literature on financial innovation is scarce and focuses on the new products and distribution channels in the traditional banking (Frame and White, 2009) . Most of these studies have focused on users' incentives to adopt innovations according to their individual characteristics.
11 DeYoung et al. (2007) and Hernando et al. (2007) analyze the impact of the adoption of online banking on banks' profitability and find that the Internet channel is a complement to rather than a substitute for physical branches.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the institutional environment in which peer-to-peer lending platforms evolve. In section 3, we explain how we assemble our data set, provide data sources and variable definition. In section 4, we explain our identification strategy and provide empirical results. In section 5, we conclude.
Institutional environment of peer-to-peer lending platforms in the United States
Online lending marketplaces are platforms that connect individuals or businesses wishing to obtain a loan with individuals and institutions willing to commit to fund this loan. Marketplace lending encompasses P2P lending platforms, which offer lending-based crowdfunding for consumers and small businesses, and online lending platforms by large institutions (e.g., OnDeck Capital, Kabbage), which offer credit exclusively to businesses, rather than consumers.
12 In our paper, we focus on P2P lending platforms, on which multiple lenders lend small sums of money online to consumers or small businesses with the expectation of periodic repayment.
Prosper Marketplace and Lending Club launched the first online P2P lending platforms in the United-States respectively in 2006 and 2007, followed by other companies such as Upstart, Funding Circle, CircleBack Lending or Peerform. Between 2006 and 2015, the two most important platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, have facilitated approximately $8.7 billion loans. 13 Both platforms believe that their online marketplace model has key advantages relative to traditional bank lending both for borrowers and investors, among which convenience of online operations, automation, reduced cost and time to access credit.
Consumer loan amounts vary between a minimum loan of $1,000 for Prosper and $500 for Lending Club and a maximum loan of $35,000 for both platforms ($300,000 for businesses). They fund various types of projects ranging from credit card debt consolidation to home improvement, short-term and bridge loans, vehicle loans or engagement loans.
Prosper and Lending Club rely on a partnership with WebBank, an FDIC-insured, Utahchartered industrial bank that originates all borrower loans made through their marketplaces. In December 2014, Lending Club became the first publicly traded online peer-to-peer lending company in the United-States, after its Initial Public Offering on the New York Stock Exchange.
As in many other two-sided markets (Rysman, 2009) , online lending marketplaces try to attract two different groups of users, namely borrowers and investors, by choosing an appropriate structure of fees that increases the size of network effects. On the borrower side of the market, both companies compete with banking institutions, credit unions, credit card issuers and other consumer finance companies. They also compete with each other and with other online marketplaces such as Upstart or Funding Circle. Platforms claim that their prices are lower on average than the ones consumers would pay on outstanding credit card balances or unsecured installment loans funded by traditional banks. 15 Online marketplaces perform the traditional screening function of banks by defining various criteria that must be met by borrowers. Any U.S. resident aged at least 18 with a U.S. bank account and a social security number may apply and request a loan, provided that the platform is authorized in her/his state. Platforms collect online some information about the applicant (i.e., FICO score, debt-to-income ratio, credit report…), which is used to compute a proprietary credit score. Some additional enquiries may also be performed offline (e.g., employment verification). Consumers are divided into several rating segments, which correspond to different fixed interest rates ranging from 6% to 26% for Lending Club in 2014. Origination fees paid to the platform depend on the consumer's level of risk.
On the investor side, online lending marketplaces face potential competition from investment vehicles and asset classes such as equities, bonds and commodities. Prosper claims to offer an asset class that has attractive risk adjusted returns compared to its competitors. Investors can be divided into two different populations: individuals and institutions. Both populations are subject to different requirements. Individual investors must be U.S. residents aged at least 18, with a social security number, and sometimes a driver's license or a state identification card number. Institutional investors must provide a taxpayer identification number and entity formation documentation. Investors' annual income must exceed a floor defined by platforms' rules. Prosper and Lending Club issue a series of unsecured Notes for each loan that are sold to the investors (individual or institutional), and recommend that each investor diversifies his/her portfolio by purchasing small amounts from different loans. 16 Each investor is entitled to receive pro-rata principal and interest payments on the loan, net of a service charge paid to the platform. In addition to the "Note Channel", Prosper has designed specifically a "Whole Loan Channel" for accredited investors (according to the definition set forth in Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933), which must be approved by the platform. Accredited Investors can purchase a borrower loan in its entirety directly from Prosper.
The lending market in the United-States is subject to many regulations, which are changing continuously (e.g., State Usury Laws, State Securities Laws, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Truth-in-Lending Act…). Online lending platforms need to obtain a license to operate in a given state and comply with all existing regulations on consumer lending. For example, currently, Lending Club does not facilitate loans to borrowers in Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska and North Dakota, but has obtained a license in all other jurisdictions. Furthermore, state and local government authorities may impose additional restrictions on their activities (such as a cap on the fees charged to borrowers) or mandatory disclosure of information. In some states, platforms are opened to borrowers but not to investors, or vice versa. Authorizations can also differ for Prosper and Lending Club.
An important issue is the potential violation of states' usury laws. The interest rates charged to borrowers are based upon the ability under federal law of the issuing bank that originates the loan (i.e., WebBank) to "export" the interest rates of its jurisdiction (i.e., Utah) to other states. This enables the online marketplace to provide for uniform rates to all borrowers in all states in which it operates. Therefore, if a state imposes a low limit on the maximum interest rates for consumer loans, some borrowers could still borrow at a higher rate through an online marketplace since the loan is originated in Utah.
17 Some states have opted-out of the exportation regime, which allows banks to export the interest rate permitted in their jurisdiction, regardless of the usury limitations imposed by the borrower's state.
Data
To construct variables about the diffusion of P2P lending, we rely on loan book data from Lending Club and Prosper Marketplace. For Lending Club we have 376 261 observation points, corresponding to a total volume of funded loans equal to $3.2 billion, starting from January 2007 to December 2013. This amounts to 99.25% of the Lending club portfolio. For Prosper we have 88 988 observation points, corresponding to a total volume of originated loans equal to $662 million, starting from January 2006 to 30 October 2013. This amounts to 100% of the total Prosper portfolio. There are 313 counties with zero P2P loans in our final dataset.
Since loan book data provides information about each borrower's city, we can assign a county name to each borrower by matching with an official data containing US States, cities and counties. 18 Our analysis ends in 2013, because platforms have stopped providing city names afterwards. Due to missing values and mistakes in city names, we lose 4.8% of the volume of funded loans in the Lending Club dataset and 10% from the Prosper dataset. Next, we aggregate this data at the year-county level to construct two measures of P2P lending diffusion: number of P2P loans per capita and volume of P2P lending per capita. For large cities belonging to multiple counties, we split the total data between counties weighted by total income per county. Table 1 shows the total volume of funded loans, the number of counties and the total number of loans that we have in our dataset. We can now map the depth of the P2P development at the county level for each year ( Figure  3 ). As early as 2007, 1183 counties had P2P borrowers, and their number has increased to 1881 in 2010 and to 2609 in 2013.
For cross-sectional regressions, we aggregate yearly data for each county and, then, merge our dataset with other datasets that contain our explanatory variables. Our specification accounts for a large number of county characteristics that could influence the expansion of the P2P lending.
Crisis variables
To measure the effects of the financial crisis on the penetration of the P2P lending, we rely on two types of variables. First, we compute the share of deposits in each county affected by bank failures during the analyzed period. To do this, we merge FDIC Failed Bank List with the data on branches of these banks in each county from the FDIC Summary of Deposits. This is an exhaustive database about all branches of deposit taking institutions in the US, providing data on the amount of deposits at the branch level. We then compute the share of deposits held by failed banks in a county i in the total amount of deposits held by all banks in a county i as of 31 December, 2013. As shown by Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) , there is a wide geographic heterogeneity with respect to bank failures in the US and it is possible that customers from counties that have been the most affected by the crisis have relied more on alternative credit providers. If our crisis-related hypothesis is confirmed, we expect a positive sign on this variable.
Our second measure of the depth of the financial crisis relies on the FDIC Summary of Deposits to identify the presence of branches in each county that we merge with information on capital at the bank consolidated level, taken from Call Reports. This measure is based on the assumption that banks' capital management is done at the consolidated level (Haas and van Lelyveld, 2010). We rely on two measures of capital (unweighted leverage ratio and riskweighted tier 1 capital ratio) computed during the crisis period 2009-2010 19 . Solvency ratio of a county i is computed as an average capital ratios of banks present in a county i weighted by deposits of their branches in county i. If our crisis-related hypothesis is confirmed, we expect a negative sign on this variable. 19 We define these two years as crisis-years because bank capital ratios and loan growth were at their lowest and bank failures and credit-card delinquencies at the highest during this period. This allows us to capture the severity of the crisis. Ideally, we would like to explore banking competition, but this is notoriously difficult to measure, particularly at the county level. The FDIC Summary of Deposits allows us to compute concentration measures, such as HHI and C3 indices, as well as branch density per 10000 population. To eliminate any endogeneity due to reverse causality, we estimate these variables in 2007. Since some studies show that market structure could be unrelated to the banking competition (Claessens and Laeven, 2004), we prefer to refer to these measures as market structure or concentration measures.
Measuring competition and brand loyalty
Market structure measures could be correlates of bank quality and brand loyalty. In particular, branch density measures the outreach of the financial sector in terms of access to banks' physical outlets (Benfratello et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2007) . Branch density is also a measure of the quality of the overall bank network and could play an important role in the bank's advertising strategy to develop brand loyalty (Dick, 2007) . Indeed, branches are a form of advertising for banks. Dick (2007) provides plenty of anecdotal evidence on how banks hope to attract customers using their branches, usually with stylish merchandising and customer service. Banks become more visible to consumers through their branches; in fact, banks are known to put clocks outside their branches for this reason. Importantly, there is evidence that banks open branches mostly in response to their own market targets, as opposed to their existing customers' needs.
Banking sector is a highly concentrated market with high switching costs. If bank customers wanted to switch to P2P lending, they would need to incur learning costs about P2P platforms, transaction costs to set up their profile, describe their loan (a task that is performed by their credit officer in a bank), as well as to overcome brand loyalty. Since our study is done in the homogeneous institutional environment in the context of switching to one of the two very similar lending platforms, learning and transaction costs should be similar across counties. We control for educational attainment and age, which could be correlated with learning costs. The remaining geographic heterogeneity in banking concentration could be a subjective measure of brand loyalty.
In light of this discussion, the impact of the concentration measures on the expansion of the P2P lending could be interpreted differently. A positive correlation between market concentration and P2P lending platforms could signal that customers from highly concentrated markets try to switch to alternative, less costly providers. A negative correlation, on the contrary, could signal that high market concentration reflects high brand loyalty, which slows down the penetration of the P2P lending.
Finally, since lending marketplaces operate online, their entry decision at the county level is exogenous and it is not correlated to the density of bank branches.
Measuring openness to innovation and new communication and informational technologies
To proxy for openness to innovation, we use U.S. Patent and Trademark Office data to compute the number of patents per capita. This measure is often used as a measure of innovation and, as such, it has a number of shortcomings, since some innovations are not patented and patents differ enormously in their economic impact. Nonetheless, our objective is not to measure innovation per se, but rather to account for a local culture that has a high propensity to generate innovative ideas and, hence, accept innovative ideas of others. Such culture could be more open to new forms of financing though P2P lending.
To measure the penetration of internet at the county level, we rely on the NTIA's State Broadband Initiative that allows us to compute the following measures: 1) percent of county population with access to any broadband technology (excluding satellite); 2) percent of county population with access to Mobile Wireless (Licensed) technology; 3) percent of county population with access to upload speed 50 mbps or higher. Each measure is computed as an average between 2010 and 2013, the only data available at the county level. All these variables should have an expected positive sign if our innovation-based hypothesis is confirmed.
Socio-economic characteristics
We control for the socio-economic characteristics, such as age, education attainment, population density, poverty level, race etc. We expect that counties with higher educational attainment, higher population density and higher proportion of young people, should have higher levels of P2P lending penetration because human capital and network effects of urban areas are significant predictors of the technological diffusion. These characteristics could also be correlates with brand loyalty.
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As to poverty rate and race, we have no theoretical priors about the sign of their impact. Racial minorities might be less familiar with online lending opportunities, but their demand could be higher because race identification is no longer possible on P2P lending platforms.
21 Interestingly, racial identification was possible during earlier years of the P2P lending when borrowers had the possibility to post a picture. This has led to the well documented discrimination of racial minorities on the Prosper lending platform (Pope and Sydnor, 2011; Ravina, 2012; Duarte et al., 2012) . Consequently, platforms have removed the possibility of posting a photo which has made the identification of borrowers' race impossible. This could incentivise racial minorities to turn to the P2P platforms to avoid discrimination that is well documented in traditional credit markets (see a literature review by Pagern and Shepherd, 2008) .
We introduce state level dummies to control for differences in state-level regulation of consumer lending and P2P lending platforms, as well as other state characteristics that are not captured by our county-level variables. These dummies account for the fact that Iowa was closed for borrowers from both Lending Club and Prosper platforms, while Maine and North Dakota were closed for Prosper platform.
Spatial relations
Our data contain explicit spatial relationships, as counties are likely to be subject to observable and unobservable common disturbances which will lead to spatial correlation. This could be explained by various channels of interdependence due to regional business cycles and economic shocks, technology diffusion, access to bank branches, policy coordination, regional disparities for which we do not control with our right-hand variables (see e.g. Garrett et al. 2005 for the importance of spatial correlation in state branching policy). Spatial correlation could also occur because of the boundary mismatch problems when the economic notion of a market does not correspond well with the county boundaries (Rey and Montouri, 1999) . Spatial correlation is particularly important for the diffusion of technology due to a theory of human interactions (Comin et al., 2012) . Borrowers from P2P lending platform require acquiring knowledge about their existence, as well as trust in their reliability, which often comes from interactions with other agents. The frequency and success of these interactions is likely to be shaped by geography. Hence, we expect that knowledge about P2P potential is likely to be more easily transmitted between agents in counties that are close than between counties that are far apart. Figure 3 also attest to this hypothesis. To account for spatial correlation, we introduce a spatial lag in our model.
Overall, we have sufficient cross-sectional data for 3,059 out of 3,144 counties and county equivalents. Table 2 provides exact definition of all variables and Table 3 provides summary statistics.
Methodology

A. Model specification: a spatial autoregressive model
Our objective is to test i) The three hypothesis on the adoption of P2P lending (See Section 3); ii)
Whether adopting P2P lending in a county has a positive impact on the adoption of P2P lending in neighboring counties. We specify the following regression model, also known as a SARAR model in the literature (See Anselin, 1988): i and j represent the ℎ counties; is the log of our observed dependent variable, that is either the volume of P2P lending per county per capita or the number of P2P loans per county per capita; W= ∑ =1 is a weighted average of our dependent variable (volume or number of P2P loans per capita), known as a spatial lag, where the weights are determined by an N × N spatial weights contiguity matrix W=∑ =1
where each element expresses the degree of spatial proximity between county i and county j 22 ; λ is the unobserved spatial autoregressive coefficient; 1 is the unobserved coefficient of our observed independent variables regarding competition and market structure; 1 is the unobserved coefficient of our observed independent variables regarding the credit rationing; 1 is the unobserved coefficient of our observed independent variables regarding the innovation and internet variables; α is the coefficient for our socio-economic and demographic variables (See table 2 for the detailed list of observed independent variables) ; ρ is the unobserved spatial autoregressive coefficient as, in our model, 22 The matrix W we use is a "minmax-normalized" matrix, where the ( , ) ℎ element of W becomes = wij , where = { (r ), (c )}, being (r ) the largest row sum of W and (c ), the largest column sum of W. We also use the inverse-distance matrix composed of weights that are inversely related to the distances between the units, and we obtain similar results in our regression. Obtaining similar results with an inversedistance and a contiguity matrix is consistent with the findings of LeSage and Pace, 2010. we allow the error term to be affected by the disturbances of neighbors; ε and are unobserved error terms. Thus, this model specification accounts not only for spatial correlation of the dependent variable, but also for spatial correlation within the error terms, which could be affected by unobservable factors such as regional economic cycles. Ignoring spatial relation, in this case, could potentially lead to inconsistency in the standard errors.
Our main objects of interest are the coefficients , ,δ, α and λ. , , δ measure the marginal impact of market structure variables, crisis variables, innovation variables as well as socioeconomic and demographic variables on the adoption of P2P lending in each county. When the dependent variable is the volume of P2P loans per capita, the magnitude of the coefficient , , δ, α predict of how many dollars the volume of P2P loans will increase or decrease for a one unit increase of the control variable. When the dependent variable is the number of loans, the magnitude of the coefficients , , δ, α predict how many additional or less loans there will be following a one unit increase of the control variable. Finally, λ measures how the adoption of P2P lending in a given county positively impacts neighbour counties. If this coefficient is significantly greater than 0, we can conclude that there is a correlation between the adoption of P2P lending between neighbouring counties, To compute our cross-sectional spatial regressions, we use the Maximum-Likelihood Estimator method, 23 as the OLS estimation will be biased and inconsistent due to simultaneity bias (See Anselin, 2003 and LeSage and Pace, 2009 for a theoretical explanation on why MLE solves the simultaneity bias).
24 As a matter of fact, the spatial lag term must be treated as an endogenous variable since the volumes of loans in contingent counties are simultaneously impacting one another.
Our findings are presented in Tables 4-7 and they all show that we always reject the null hypothesis that the spatial lag lambda is greater or equal to 0. Spatial lag is always positive and statistically significant, pointing to the existence of strong spatial effects. In other words, the higher the level of P2P loans in one county, the higher it is going to be in the contingent counties.
B. OLS vs. SARAR
Since from the SARAR model the estimates for the coefficients ρ and λ are significantly different from zero, ordinary least-squares may lead to inconsistent estimations. Table 9 in the Appendix shows the estimates from the OLS regression model. If we compare these estimates to the output from our SARAR model, we realize that they are mostly biased up-words as in Lesage (2008) .
Empirical results
The SARAR model estimates cannot be interpreted as partial derivatives like in the typical regressions (see Le Sage and Pace, 2009). Therefore the coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal effects of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable in one region, because a change in the explanatory variable is likely to impact the dependent variable in all neighboring regions too. In subsection A we will discuss the short-run impacts of a change in the explanatory variables on the volume and number of P2P lending per capita in each county. In subsection B, we will compute the average total direct impact (ATDI), the average total indirect impacts (ATII) and the average total impact (ATI) which is the sum of the direct and indirect impacts. Table 4 and table 5 present our empirical findings for the P2P expansion (in terms of volume and number of loans respectively) as a function of different county characteristic, with a particular focus on crisis and competition characteristics.
A. Empirical results: short run impacts of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable
Among socio-demographic variables, higher population density, higher educational attainment, lower levels of poverty, lower levels of income and higher share of Hispanic and Black minorities have a positive and significant impact on the expansion of the P2P lending. An increase of population density by one standard deviation significantly increases the volume of the P2P lending and the number of loans. An increase of bachelor graduates by one standard deviation significantly increases the volume of the P2P lending and the number of loans. An increase of the share of Hispanic minorities by one standard deviation increases the volume of the P2P lending and the number of loans. As reported in table 8, this result is driven by Lending Club. Also, an increase of the share of Black minorities by one standard deviation increases the number of the P2P loans, but does not affect the volume. An increase in the percentage of people leaving under the poverty line decreases the volume of P2P lending and the number of P2P loans. Also, the income per capita affects negatively only the volume of loans: an increase in the income per capita decreases the volume of P2P loans. The variables measuring the age of the population are never significant for these specifications.
Our finding that the expansion of the P2P lending is faster in counties with higher share of Black and Hispanic minorities could be a sign of higher demand from these areas to escape discrimination in traditional credit markets. As online lenders have removed the possibility to post a photo, identifying the race of the borrower has become much more difficult. During our sample period, 2007-2013, investors had access to the information on the location of borrowers. Although this information could have been used by institutional investors as a proxy for race, it is unlikely that retail investors would do that. Recently, any information on the location of the borrower has been removed, which makes the identification of the race completely impossible. Hence, racial discrimination is not anymore possible in the online lending.
The positive effect of the higher educational attainment is consistent with the fact that human capital is a significant predictor of the technological diffusion and could diminish switching costs due to lower cost of learning. A positive effect of population density reflects the existence of network effects in urban areas that is another well-known predictor of the diffusion of new technologies.
As to the crisis variables, our findings show that in both specifications of table 4 and 5, the leverage ratio is statistically significant and has a negative effect on P2P lending expansion both in terms of volume and loans. A decrease of the leverage ratio during the financial crisis increases the volume of lending, and increases the number of loans. The share of deposits affected by failed banks and the Tier 1 capital ratios during the crisis did not have an impact on the diffusion of P2P lending. This finding is consistent with the idea that leverage ratios appear to be better predictors of future banks' performance and problems (Blundell-Wignall and Roulet, 2013; Haldane, 2011a Haldane, , 2012 ) with respect to weighted leverage ratios, since weights may be inconsistent and subject to manipulations Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2014; Le Leslé and Avramova, 2012; Haldane 2012; FSA, 2010) .
Most of P2P borrowers use lending platforms to consolidate and manage their credit card debt and a minority borrow for business purposes. To account for difficulties in the credit card market, we test the robustness of our results by constructing two additional crisis variables: percentage change in credit card debt balance per capita and percent of credit card debt balance with more than 90 days of delinquency during crisis years. The data comes from the New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel / Equifax that is available only for 2220 counties. None of these variables turns out to be statistically significant. Results are available upon request.
In addition, Table 4 and table 5 present the empirical findings for the P2P expansion as a function of market structure variables. Our findings demonstrate that low branches density in 2007 is a statistically significant driver of the P2P lending. We interpret this result as a suggestion that customers living in counties with low outreach of traditional banks and low quality of financial services are more likely to turn to P2P lending due to weaker brand loyalty.
Counties that had one standard deviation less branches in 2007, experienced an increase in the average volume of P2P lending and an increase in the number of P2P loans.
Turning our attention to concentration measures, both our concentration measures C3 and HHI have a negative and statistically significant sign. In other words, P2P lending penetrates fewer counties with higher concentration of the largest three banks and with a higher overall traditional banking market concentration. This is consistent with the interpretation of the high market concentration as an outcome of high switching costs due to strong brand loyalty. An increase of the concentration of the three biggest banks by one standard deviation diminishes the average amount of the P2P lending and the number of loans, whereas an increase in the concentration of the whole traditional banking market in one county diminishes the average amount of P2P lending and the number of loans.
We additionally test the impact of the alternative consumer credit providers, such as payday loans. To do so, we use County Business Patterns to construct the ratio of non-bank establishments that are related to consumer lending and credit intermediation per capital (Bhutta, 2013) . We find that P2P lending is more diffused in counties with a higher number of payday loan establishments. In particular, an increase in the number of payday loans establishments increases the volume of P2P lending at a 10% level of significance. This might reflect a higher demand for alternative consumer credit. Table 6 and table 7 present results with variables that capture the geographic heterogeneity of the innovation, measured by the quality of Internet connection and by the number of patents issued by each county. Since the variable which measures the number of patents is correlated to the level of education, we performed one specification excluding the level of education, and found that it is statistically significant and with a positive sign. Counties with density of patents that is one standard deviation above the average exhibit a higher volume of P2P lending and an increase in the number of loans. Among the variables describing the quality of Internet, only broadband and mobile are statistically significant and have a negative sign only when the dependent variable is the volume of loans. High Internet quality and speed do not impact the number of P2P borrowers. As a matter of fact, the negative and significant effect of broadband is present only starting from the year 2012, whereas it is positive and significant on the year 2008 and otherwise it is never significant.
The age structure only plays a role for Lending Club: a higher percentage of population aged between 20 and 34 increases the volume of P2P loans but decreases the number of loans. With respect to the minorities, counties with a higher share of Hispanic population have a higher number of P2P loans on both platforms but only a higher volume of Lending Club loans. 
B. Computing marginal effects
Following the method proposed by Drukker et al. 2013, we manually compute the average total direct and indirect impacts of the explanatory variables (crisis, competition, innovation and socio-economic and demographic variables) on the dependent variable (either volume or number of P2P loans per capita per county) using the reduced-form predictors coming from the SARAR regression. Doing so allows us to understand the magnitude of these effects. For example, as shown in table 11, an increase by one standard deviation of the number of branches in a given region decreases the average volume of P2P lending per capita of all regions by 0.0013% (ATDI). Similarly, an increase by one standard deviation of the number of branches in all neighboring regions, reduces by 0.0004 % the volume of P2P lending per capita in that one region (ATII). The signs of the coefficients are the same as the short-run impacts shown in table 4-8, and in general the direct impacts are stronger than the indirect ones, which leads to the fact that total impacts are composed mainly by direct impacts in our main sample.
Concluding remarks and future extensions
This paper is a first attempt to explore the drivers of the expansion of online lenders. We have proposed three hypotheses related to (1) the competition in the brick-and-mortar banking sector and switching costs to online lenders, (2) the consequences of the financial crisis and (3) the innovation and internet expansion. We also account for spatial effects and socio-economic and demographic characteristics.
Our findings suggest that online lenders have made inroads into counties that have a poor branch network. This suggests that borrowers that either live far away from a brick and mortar bank branch or have a poor branch experience due to long waiting times are more likely to turn to online lenders due to lower brand loyalty. We also find that counties with a more concentrated banking structure have witnessed slower growth of online lenders, which is also consistent with the idea of higher brand loyalty. Higher education and higher propensity to innovate play a significant and positive role, possibly because these characteristics diminish the costs of learning about online lenders. Our results show that the leverage ratio during the crisis has affected the demand for online lending. Despite the online nature of the P2P lending, spatial effects play a crucial role, which could be interpreted as an important role of social interactions in building trust in online markets.
Our analysis could be extended in a number of ways. First, we would like to use the panel nature of the data to estimate Bass model of the innovation diffusion. Second, we would like to explore the balancing of demand and supply in the P2P lending. This is possible due to the information in our dataset about loan demand that has not been met because loans have been rejected by online lenders or have failed to attract potential lenders. 
